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A graphical analysis of the functioning of tariff rate quotas: market access and
welfare effects for exporting countriesl
Cathie Laroche Dupraz and Alan Matthews
Abstract
This paper analyses the economics of tariff rate quotas assuming a large importing
country and several different suppliers with differing levels of competitiveness.
Eleven theoretical situations are distinguished according to the way the quota is
allocated to exporters, the level of constraint imposed by the quota and the relative
competitiveness of export suppliers. A graphical analysis is developed and the effects
of tariff rate quotas on market access and welfare gains for exporters are discussed in
the eleven cases.
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1. Introduction
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) legitimised tariff rate quotas
(TRQs) as market access instruments. It was feared that the tariffication of non-tariff
barriers in the agricultural sector as a result of the Agreement would lead to high
bound most favoured nation (MFN) tariffs, and the purpose of TRQs was to ensure a
minimum level of access to importing country markets as well as to secure the market
access of current exporters. At the conclusion of the URAA, 1371 TRQs were notified
to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) by a total of 37 countries (G/AGÀ{G/5/7).
However, a number of studies have indicated that the operation of TRQs has given
rise to problems and have questioned the usefulness of TRQs for exporters (de Gorter
and Sheldon, 2000; Skully, 2OOl).In particular, TRQ amounts have often been under-
utilised, which has been attributed in part to the way in which they have been
managed by importing countries, and minimum access quotas have not always been
honoured (G/AGAIG/517).II addition, TRQs generate quota rents, and the procedures
for allocating quota entitlements, including the division of rents, have distorted trade
and are often subject to political pressure (Abbott and Morse, 1999; Abbott,200l).
Thus, the future role of TRQs and the way in which they should be managed is one of
the issues on the agenda of the current Doha round of WTO trade negotiations
(Matthews and Laroch e Dupraz, 200 1 ).
The purpose of this paper is to describe and analyse in theoretical terms the various
outcomes which may arise with the operation of TRQs, with the objective of
highlighting their economic effects both for the importing country which makes use of
them and for the exporting countries which are subject to them. We investigate in
particular the circumstances in which TRQs can lead to positive gains for exporting
counfries. As noted, TRQs were introduced either to create new market access
opportunities (minimum access quotas) or to maintain existing trade flows (current
access quotas) following the tariffication of non-tariff barriers to agricultural trade.
We first examine the circumstances in which these objectives are met or not.
Subsequently, we use a graphical analysis to explore the nature of the economic
effects associated with TRQs (whether the creation of rents or otherwise) and their
importance in terms of economic welfare for exporters compared to the effects of a
simple MFN tariff regime.
The classical exposition of the economic effects of a TRQ assumes a small counffy
importer unable to influence the world price and makes use of an infinitely elastic
(horizontal) export supply function at the given world price level. For example, Skully
(2001) and Elbehri et al. (1999) graphically represent a TRQ as two horizontal curyes,
one drawn at the world price plus the in-quota tariff and the other at the world price
plus the over-quota MFN tariff. Elbehri et al. (1999) develop a model of this type to
integrate TRQs into the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) computable general
equilibrium model, in order to be able to include the impact of TRQs on market
access and economic welfare, and in particular to account for the allocation of quota
rents between importers and exporters. Under these assumptions, the unit value of the
rent when the TRQ is binding is equal to the difference between the domestic price,
on the one hand, and the world price plus the in-quota tariff, on the other hand. The
impact of the TRQ on the world price is of course ignored under the assumption of a
small country importer.
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OECD (2002) and Mônnich (2003) introduce the large counfry assumption into their
analysis of the functioning of TRQs, which is more in line with the reality of their use
by the EU, Japan and to a lesser extent, the US and Canada which are the principal
users of this instrument. But the graphical analysis used in these two papers is focused
on the interactions between the manner of licence allocation (first come first served,
historical shares, etc.) and the TRQ fill rate for the EU and other OECD countries. In
our analysis, we choose to set aside this question of the precise manner in which
import licences are allocated between economic agents (exporting firms, importing
firms, importing or exporting states, etc.) in order to focus on the welfare effects for
exporters that have the possibility of benefiting from TRQ access.
To simplify our analysis, we assume that import licences are always made available to
the exporting country and never to the importing country (whether individual firms or
the state). This is far from always being the case, and thus the results which we obtain
must be interpreted in the light of this hypothesis. Even within this simplified
framework, however, the way in which a TRQ is implemented, and in particular the
rules for allocating the quota among potential suppliers, is crucial for deciding both
the allocation of market share and quota rent. Some TRQs are global quotas, open to
all suppliers without distinction. Others (such as the TRQ for sugar in the EU) are
allocated to specific suppliers which are thus guaranteed access to the market of the
importing country. Does this mean that they automatically benefit from a rent on
these exports? If this is not the case, what is then the nature of the economic gain
arising from the operation of this TRQ?
Previous analyses of the operation of TRQs make the assumption of a single infinitely
elastic source of export supplies. This framework does not take into account the
possible competition between alternative sources of supply on the market of the
importing country. Looking at the operation of EU agricultural TRQs it is clear that,
in many cases, there can be a variety of exporters each with different levels of cost
competitiveness which may be competing on the EU import market.
In this paper, we assume that the importing country is a large country in world market
terms and we introduce the possibility of several sources of export supplies competing
for access to this import market. The effects of a TRQ in terms of both market access
and economic welfare are identified, taking into account not only the quota rent but
also changes in the economic surplus of exporters able to take advantage of the TRQ.
Section 2 of the paper develops the graphical framework for the analysis taking
account of a variety of different situations concerning the restrictiveness of the TRQ
(whether it is filled or not), the manner in which the quota is allocated among
potential exporters and their relative competitiveness. Section 3 summarises the
results of the analysis and the principal conclusions as well as suggesting directions
for future work.
2. Graphical analysis of tariff rate quotas
This section presents a graphical analysis of the impact of TRQs on the economic
welfare of exporting countries. The classical analysis is extended in two ways: we
allow for the possibility that the export supply curves of exporting countries are
upward sloping, and we take into account two exporting countries (or regions) with
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different costs of production and therefore different levels of competitiveness. We
distinguish the case where the TRQ is allocated specifically to a counfry or group of
counffies from the case of a global TRQ which is open to all potential exporters. For
the purposes of making the graphical representation as easy to follow as possible, we
have assumed that tariffs take the form of specific rather than ad valorem tariffs.
The first case describes the situation where one source of export supply benefits from
a specific allocation under the TRQ. Other potential exporterso which are not allocated
a share of the TRQ, cannot benefit from the reduced in-quota tariff. Their exports face
the full over-quota tariff, the MFN tariff. For this first case, we will describe first the
situation where the preferred exporter is more competitive than other potential
suppliers, and then the reverse situation.
Two parameters influence the economic impact of the TRQ: whether the quota is
binding or not, and whether over-quota imports exist or not. Eleven different
situations are identified (cases a through k). We focus the analysis on the economic
surplus enjoyed by the exporters who use all or part of the quota as well as on the
level of quota rent created in each situation.
A TRQ is defined by an import quota designated Q. The tariff applied on imports
within this quota volume is designated /, and the MFN tariff applied to over-quota
imports is designated T. Two separate concepts can be distinguished, the preferential
margin and the quota rent. The unit preferential margin is defined as the difference
between the over-quota tariff T and the in-quota taiff t. The unit quota rent, where it
exists, depends on the extent to which the quota is filled, and on the existence of an
export supply within the quota. The notation used in the graphical analysis in this
section is summarised in Table 1.
Table 1. of notation used
Demand Supply Price
D, total demand for
imports
Dpps, residuâl demand
Q, volume of the tariff rate
quota
51, in-quota supply at the in-quota
tariff t
S1Os9, over-euota supply at the over-
quota tariff T
51, supply at the over-quota tariff T in
the absence of a TRQ
SPru, preferred supply (benefiting
from a specific allocation of the
TRQ)
SNPF, other supply (at the MFN over-
quota tariff)
QPru, quantity supplied by
preferential suppliers SPRB
QNPF, quantity supplied by non-
preferred suppliers SwN
Qror_QPRE+QMFN
t, in-quota tariff
T, over-quota tariff
P, domestic price of imports
P', supply price of exporter
J
Allocation of TRQ to a preferred supplier
The total demand for imports of the importing country is denoted as D. It faces two
potential sources of supply. To take account of the specific allocation of the TRQ to a
preferred supplier, we introduce the concept which we call the residual demand Dnrs.
This represents the import demand which remains after the imports supplied by the
preferred exporter within the TRQ are taken into account. For each price level, Dnrs =
D 
- 
S,PRE.
In the diagrams which follow, we distinguish between Sr(.o)Pre and SrPre :
- Sr(."r)PM is the over-quota export supply, at the tariff T, originating from the
preferred exporter which is available to meet the residual import demand after
consumption of the quota volume Q.
- Srto is the total export supply of the preferred exporter which would
materialise in the absence of the TRQ. The vertical interval equal to (T 
- 
/)
separates the export supply curves SrPre and S,Pm.
Under a TRQ regime, SPM = Srt* + Sr(."r)PM.
Under a simple MFN regime, SPRE = Srt*". In other-words, there is a horizontal
displacemenfq b"t*""tr the export supply curves Sr(r"r)tre and SrPm.
2.1.1. Case where the prefened. supplier is also the most competitive
In each diagram, the preferred export supply is represented by a curve with two steps :
SPre = S,Pm +S11r"r1Pm where S,Pru is the preferred country export supply under the
in-quota tariff regime t and Srtr"rl"* is the preferred country export supply under the
over-quota tariff T in the case where the quota Q is filled. The two steps of the curve
SPm are parallel but displaced vertically from one another by the amount (T 
- 
/).
The intersection of the curves S,Pre and D indicates whether the TRQ quantity Q is
binding or not. In the case where Q is not filled, neither Srt'.r1"* nor S1w is
sufficiently competitive to access the importing country's market. This is the case (a)
described below.
a) Case where the TRQ is not filled
The import price P is determined by the intersection of the curves P_gnd S,Pm. nt this
price, the fnq is not completely fiiled by the preferred country S,Pre. ttre over-quota
supply is zero, and no rent is created by the TRQ.
Because it benefits from a reduced tariff, the preferred country gains an improvement
in its market access compared to a situation in the absence of the TRQ. The surplus of
the preferred exporter is represented by the dotted triangle, and it would be smaller in
the absence of the additional market access created by the TRQ. The surplus gain due
to the TRQ conesponds to the difference between the exporter's surplus in the TRQ
regime (the dotted triangle) and in the MFN regime, which would be the triangle
[abc]. Under the assumption of linear supply and demand curves, the dotted triangle
has exactly the same area as the triangle [ade]. Thus the gain in exporter surplus due
to the TRQ is shown by the area shaded grey [bced].
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b) Case where the TRQ is fiIled, no over-quota imports, no MFN imports
For export__sgpply volumes less than the quota Q, the supply curve of the preferred
exporter SPre is aligned with StPre. The cuive DnEs is kink;d at the price P' at which
S,Pre exhausts the quota Q. In effect, for prices above P', the 
""port supply S,Pre islieited by the quota Q. For prices above the level (P' + T), the export supply curve
S"ru is displaced upwards by an amount (T 
- 
r) with respect to the curve S,Pre.
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The import price P is determined by the intersection of the decreasing demand curve
D and the vertical line showing the quota Q. The TRQ is completely filled by exports
from the beneficiary country S1Pre.
In this case, the TRQ improves the market access of the preferred country. By virtue
of the reduced tariff rate which it faces, the preferred exporter gains an export surplus
represented by the dotted triangle. The solid grey band, determined graphically in the
same way as in case (a), represents this export surplus gain with respect to the
situation where the preferred exporter faces a simple MFN tariff regime T.
In addition, the preferred exporter obtains a quota rent equal to (P 
- 
P')*Q,
represented graphically by the rectangular hatched area. This rent must be added to
the gain in surplus already mentioned.' Note that the amount of the unit rent (p 
- 
p') is
less than the margin of preference (T 
- 
/).
c) Case where the TRQ is fiIled, over-quota imports, zero MFN imports
In this case, the curve DpB5 is kinked at the price level at which S,Pm exhausts the
quota Q. At prices above this level, the curve Dps5 is parallel to the total import
demand curve D. The domestic price of imports P is determined by the intersection of
the curves Dnrs and Sr"o**t.Àt tfrir pricè, the export supply S,"tu:1s limited by the
quota Q. The TRQ is entirely exhausted by the preferred supplier S,Pro and the volume
exported above the quota Uy ttre prefened 
"*pôrt", is QrtÉ. The export supply SIMFis not sufficiently competitive to be able to enter the market at the price P, therefore
Qw=0.
St^
SrG"gtou
Srnnr*urN
p
OO
SPRE S,"*
P
D*rt
ee""* epRE=e+err*
\ \
2 We recall again that we are assuming that the TRQ licences are allocated to the exporting country which manages
them in such a way as to secure the quota rent. In practice, this may not be the case and thus the case here
describes the maximum potential benefit to the preferred exporter.
6
The preferred exporter obtains a quota rent as a result of the reduced in-quota tariff
levied on exports within the quota. The unit quota rent is equal to the unit preference
margin (T 
- 
t). The total rent for the preferred exporter is equal to (T 
- 
t)xQ,
represented graphically the hatched rectangle.
Note that under a simple MFN re_g_ime, market access for the preferred exporter would
be exactly the same, that is d*. tn other words, for this exporter, the gain in
economic welfare as a result of the TRQ is simply the quota rent. The economic
surplus of the exporter, apart from the quota rent, represented by the dotted area, is
unchanged compared to what it would obtain under a simple MFN regime.
d) Case where the TRQ is filled, over-quota imports, MFN imports
In this case, the curve Dnss is kinked at the price where S,Pre exhausts the quota Q.
The dom*esticprice of imports B is determined by the intersection of the curves Dnrs
an_{lStMF * PM. At this price, S,Pre is limitqd by Q, the TRe is entirely exhausted by
S,Pm and the level of export supplies SrGo)"* is fùeO at QJRE ; Qtot = Q"* + Q*t.
The preferred exporter obtains a quota rent (T 
- 
/)*Q (the hatched rectangle) as a
result of the reduced in-quota tariff from which it benefits on all of the in-quota
imports. This quota rent must be added to the export surplus represented by the dotted
area, which remains unchanged compared to the situation in the absence of the TRQ.
As in the previous case, putting a TRQ in place has no effect on the market access of
the preferred exporter: Q"RE is unchanged. The TRQ simply results in a quota rent
which must be added to the export surplus of the preferred exporter.
T-t
QPRE
St**
Sr(r"r)t*
Srrnn*urNa
p
ôO
H
P
Qror
These first four diagrams a through d allow us to draw conclusions in the case where
the preferred exporter is more competitive than other potential suppliers to the import
market. If the TRQ is not filled, no rent is created (case a). If the TRQ is filled, then
the preferred exporter obtains a quota rent, regardless whether there are over-quota
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exports (cases b through d). The value of the unit quota rent is less than the
preferential margin (T 
- 
r) when there are no over-quota supplies. It is equal to the
preferential margin when the preferred exporter is sufficiently competitive to be able
to access the importer's market even at the higher over-quota tariff T (cases c, d).
In all these cases, as a result of the reduced in-quota tariff from which it benefits on its
in-quota exports, the preferred exporter will experience an increase in its economic
surplus as compared to a situation without a TRQ. This gain in economic welfare is
given by the quota rent when the preferred exporter is capable of supplying over-
quota exports at the MFN tariff (cases c, d). When the preferred exporter is not able to
export at the over-quota tariff, the TRQ creates in addition a gain in export surplus
because it results in improved market access to the import market (cases a, b), which
should be added to any quota rent which may be created in the situation where the
TRQ is completely filled (case b).
2.1.2.The preferred exporter is /ess competitive
e) The TRQ is notfilled, no MFN imports
In this case, the domestic price of imports P is determined by the intersection of the
curves D and S,Pm. et this price, the tRQ is not entirely filled by StPm which is in a
position only to supply the quantity Qt* < Q. There is no over-quota supply, and thus
no quota rent. In this case th_e_lmplementation of the TRQ clearly opens market access
to the preferred exporter. S,Pm is present on the market of the importing country and
benefits from an exporter's surplus (the dotted area) which would not exist in the
absence of the TRQ.
PRE
SrumtStn*
$
p
èo
a
P
Dnns
QPRE O
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fl Case where the TRQ is fiIled, no over-quota imports, no MFN imports
Srmr
T-r
Srumr
a
s
èô
a
P
Pt
D*"s
0
In this case, the curve Dps5 is kinked at the level of the price P' at which S1Pre
exhausts the quota Q. The domestic price of imports P is determined by the
intersection of the decreasing demand curve D and the vertical line representing the
quota Q. The TRQ quota is entirely filled by StPm.
The preferred exporter obtains a quota rent (P 
- 
P')*Q (the hatched rectangle) with
(P-P') < (T - t). As a result of the reduced in-quota tariff from which it benefits, the
preferred exporter gains an exporter surplus (the dotted area) that would not exist in
the absence of the TRQ. Thus the dotted and hatched areas together represent, for the
preferred exporter, the gain in economic welfare as a result of the TRQ.
d Case where the TRQ is not filled, MFN imports
The domestic price of imports P is determined by the intersection of the curves Dpp5
and S1MF. At this price, SlPm is fixed at QPRE < Q ; the TRQ is not filled and S1MF is
fixed at Q*t ; Qtot = Qt* + Q*".
The preferred exporter does not obtain quota rent, but the existence of the TRQ allows
it to benefit from additional exporter surplus (the dotted area) which would be zero3
without the TRQ, on the- eqsumption that SrPre is not sufficiently competitive to be
able to compete with SrMF in the absence of the quota. In this case, the principal
consequence of the TRQ is to open increased market access to the preferred exporter
to the importing country market, which would be either zero or much smaller under a
simple MFN tariff regime.
3 Or much smaller even if not zero for values of (T 
- 
r) smaller than that represented in the diagram.
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h) Case where TRQ is filled, MFN imports
The curve Dnns is kinked at the price P' at which S,Pre exhausts the quota Q. The
domestic price of imports P is determined by the intersection of the c-urves Dps5 and
Sr*o. ei tfris price, the supply S,Pre is limited by the--quota Q = QPRE; the TRQ is
entirely filled by StPreand Srm adjusts to the level Q*^.
s;nn
T-t
èo
a
\
Pt \
al
QMFN Q
SrvrnN
The preferred exporter obtains a quota lent amounting to (P - P';xq (the hatched
area) with (P-P')< (T 
- 0. As a result of the reduced in-quota tariff from which it
benefits, the preferred exporter gains an exporter surplus (the sum of the grey shaded
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area and the dotted area) that would be smaller in the absence of the TRQ. Thus the
shaded and dotted areas represent, for the preferred exporter, the gains in economic
surplus arising from the implementation of the TRQ.
Note that if the preference margin (T 
- 
/) was smaller, to the extent that the preferred
exporter was sufficiently competitive to be able to export under the over-quota tariff
regime T, then the price P would be graphically determined by the intersection of the
decreasing demand curve Dpss and the sum of the two supply curves SrPre and Sr*o.
In this case, the unit quota rent would be equal to (P 
- 
P') = (T - t) and the gain in
economic surplus for the preferred exporter would be reduced by the amount of the
quota rent. In other words, in this case the TRQ does not create export flows apart
from those from the preferred supplier (which would be present on the market even in
the absence of the TRO but allows it to benefit from the rent created by the quota-
limited market.
The cases e through ft do not differ from the cases a through d in terms of the welfare
gains for the preferred exporter which arise from the implementation of the TRQ.
However, the improved market access arising from the TRQ is more important when
the preferred exporter is less competitive. In this case, the TRQ protects the preferred
exporter from the competition from more efficient sources of supply. The TRQ makes
possible access to the import market which would be highly unlikely in the absence of
this protected access. Making a specific TRQ allocation is thus a powerful instrument
to open and improve market access for targeted exporting regions which would
otherwise be non-competitive.
Cases where the TRQ has no specific allocation
We distinguish two sources of export supply, Sl and 52, which differ in terms of their
competitiveness. We suppose that S1 is the more competitive region of the two.
i) Case where the TRQ is notfilled
T-r 2ô
s
èO
a
S,t
P
1+2
.Dt
Q2 Ql QrorQ
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The domestic price of imports is determined by the intersection of the import demand
curve D and the total expàrt supply curue S,t*t S,l*2 is not limited by the vertical line
representing the quota amount Q. The quota is therefore not filled and does not
generate any quota rent. The division of the market between suppliers I and 2, that is
the market shares Qt 
"t Q', is determined as a function of the relative competitivenessof the suppliers Stl et #. In this case, the TRQ improves market access for all
exporters.
In the absence of the TRQ and under a simple MFN regime, one could use the curves
Srt et Szt to represent Srr et Szr to determine the market equilibrium on the import
market. For this purpose, import demand is represented by the curve D', that is the
curve D displaced downwards by a vertical amount tT - /1. The diagram shows that in
this situation the exporter surplus of both exporters is represented by the dotted area.
Under a TRQ regime, the in-quota expofters benefit from an exporter surplus
represented in the diagram by the dotted and shaded areas together. The area to the
leit of the curve S,1 shows the exporter ;urplus accruing to S1; the area to the right
shows the exporter surplus accruing to 52 (the area equivalent to that which is found
to the left of ihe cu*" S,2;. Thus the gain in economic surplus as a result of the TRQ,
compared to a situation under a simple MFN regime, is shown graphically by the
shaded grey arca.
The domestic price of imports is that at which the import demand adjusts to the level
of imports Q. Àt this pricà, the export supply S,1*2 is limited by the vertical line of the
quota Q; the quota is filled. The shares of the im-port market Q1' and Q,' are
dètermined by the relative competitiveness of Stl and St2.
j) Case where the TRQ is filled, no over-quota imports
T-r 2
s
ôo
\l
S,t
P l+2
P'
'. Dt
Q2QlA
t2
Exporters I and2 both capture a quota rent. The unit value of the quota rent is (P-P')
< (T 
-/). Under the TRQ regime, the exporters benefit from an export surplus,
represented by the dotted and shaded areas, to which should be added the quota rent
(the hatched area). In the absence of the TRQ and under a simple MFN regime, the
surplus would be reduced to the dotted area.
Even more clearly, in this case, the TRQ improves market access for all exporters
They gain both from increased exporter surplus and from the quota rent.
k) Case where the TRQ is filled, over-quota imports
The curve Sl*2 presents:
- a first kink at the price level at which S12 enters the market ;
- a second kink at the price level P' at which the TRQ is filled by the supply
S,t*' ;
- a third kink at the level at which the supply S1r enters the market; and
- a fourth kink at the price at which the supply S12 enters the market.
The domestic price of imports P is determined by the intersection of the demand
curveD and the kinked supply curve S1*2.
The export supply Sr*2 is limited by the quota Q. The TRQ is filled. The market
shares Q1r and Q,' are determined by the relative competitiveness of Stl et St2. Below
the quota Q, demand is satisfied by, lhe supply.stl tg the amount Q11 and by the
supply Sr2 to the amount Q12, with q1+2 - a + Gt + Qr2. The exporters 1 and 2 gain a
quota rent with a uniti value of (T 
- 
t) on their exports at the reduced in-quota tafiff t.
This total rent is represented by the hatched area. It makes up the entire gain in
economic welfare to exporters resulting from the TRQ compared to a situation
without quota.
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In the case where the TRQ is administered globally and is not allocated specifically to
a preferred supplier or group of suppliers, and where the quota is filled, then a quota
rent is created and benefîts suppliers to the extent that they are in a position to export
within the quota (cases 7, fr). If the TRQ is not filled, no rent is created (case i). In the
absence of a specific allocation, then the relative competitiveness of exporters
determines their market shares and the share of the quota rent where this exists.
In all cases, because of the reduced in-quota tariff from which they benefit, in-quota
exporters obtain a gain in economic surplus. When there is over-quota imports, this
welfare gain is made up of the quota rento which in this case is at its maximum level,
i.e., equal to the preferential margin.
3. Results and discussion
The graphical analysis of the functioning of TRQs which we have developed in this
paper can be distinguished from other studies of this issue in a number of ways. First,
the analysis assumes a large counfry importer, an assumption closer to the reality of
TRQ implementation on world agricultural markets, and for the EU in particular.
Next, we consider the case of several potential sources of export supply, differing in
competitiveness, and competing on the importing country market.
Integrating these elements into an economic analysis of TRQs, it is possible to
determine graphically the division of the quota-constrained market between exporters
and the welfare gains they obtain, in terms both of export surplus and quota rent
where this exists, arising from the implementation of a TRQ compared to a simple
MFN tariff regime.
TRQs and market access
TRQs were introduced with two main objectives:
- to open a minimum level of market access following the tariffication of non-
tariff barriers which sometimes resulted in prohibitive tariff levels to generate
trade (minimum access TRQs)
- to protect historic trade flows with existing suppliers (current access TRQs).
The graphical analysis shows that these two objectives often conflict with each other.
Thus, a current access TRQ which is allocated to a preferred supplier that is not
sufficiently competitive to fiIl the quota, when there exists a more competitive
exporter that could supply the quota, will work contrary to the objective of ensuring a
minimum level of market access. Improvement in the global access to the importing
country market would require a revision of the way in which the quota is allocated to
less competitive exporters. However, without the preferential access guaranteed by
specific allocations under a TRQ, less competitive exporters would simply not be
successful in accessing the importing country market. In this case, the improved
market access as a result of the TRQ would fail to maintain the current access of these
exporters.
This situation is relatively common on the EU market for imports of several
agricultural products. Several EU TRQs are specifically allocated to African,
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Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, for example, to protect their historical trade in
agricultural products with the EU (rice, sugar, etc.) arising from commitments under
the Lomé and Cotonou Agreements. Without this specific allocation, the ACP
countries might not be sufficiently competitive to take advantage of the TRQ quota.
Even in the case where ttre TRQ is not completely filled, the TRQ plays an important
role in terms of ensuring market access for preferred suppliers. However, the
allocation of quotas in this way can be the subject of challenges in the WTO where
other exporters feel that they have been disadvantaged by the particular quota
allocation. An example is the very disputed case of bananas at the end of the 1990s
and which still continues with challenges to the ACP quotas by Ecuador and the US at
the beginning of 2007 (see Laroche Dtpraz, 1998). A quota allocation which runs
counter to the non-discrimination rules of the WTO may require a waiver if it is to be
sustained.
TRQs and economic welfare
Table 2 summarises the effects of a TRQ for the economic welfare of exporters
compared to a simple MFN tariff regime based on the eleven cases previously
described.
Table 2. Welfare for from a
(l) Compared to a simple MFN tariff regime, the operation of a TRQ may benefit an exporter that
is in a position to export within the quota in different ways :
a. ES 
- 
exporter surplus, excluding quota rent
b. Rent
The unit quota rent is obviously zero in those cases where the TRQ is not binding (the
quota is not filled). If there is no over-quota imports, the amount of the unit quota rent
is less than the preferential margin (T 
- 
/). When a quota rent is created, its value is
reduced to the extent that the export costs ofpreferred suppliers are above the costs of
other suppliers. The unit quota rent is equal to the preferential margin only in the case
where the preferred supply is able to fill the quota entirely and to export above the
quota at the MFN over-quota tariff.
Unit quota rent
r
Welfare gain
(1)
1 
- 
TRQ reserved for preferred exporters
LLPreferred exporters are more competitive
a) TRQ not filled 0 ES
b) TRQ filled, no over-quota imports, no MFN imports r = (P-P') <(T - t) ES, Rent
c) TRQ filled, over-quota imports, no MFN imports r=(T_t) Rent
d) TRQ filled, over-quota imports, MFN imports r=(T_t) Rent
1.2. Prefeted exporters are less competitive
e) TRQ not filled, no MFN imports 0 ES
D TRQ filled, no MFN imports, no over quota imports r = (P-P') <(T - t) ES, Rent
C) TRQ filled, MFN imports 0 ES
h) TRQ filled, MFN imports
ï"",ï"Hï#;l' <(T
=(T
(P-
rP-P')
-t)
_t)I-T=
P') ES, Rent
Rent
2- TRQ not reserved for preferred exports
i) TRQ notfilled 0 ES
i) TRQ filled, no over-quota imports r = (P-P') <(T - t) ES, Rent
k) TRQ filled, over-quota imports 1=(T-t) Rent
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In all cases, even when the quota is not binding, we observe that exporters obtain an
increase in export surplus following the implementation of a TRQ, arising from the
reduced in-quota tariff facing their in-quota exports. When the TRQ is filled, but there
are no over-quota imports, part of this export surplus is substituted by the quota rent
which they receive. When over-quota imports occur, the entire welfare gain to
exporters arising from the TRQ takes the form of the quota rent, which then attains its
maximum level: the unit rent in this case is equal to the preferential margin.
This last result is particularly interesting. As we indicated in the Introduction, in order
to simplify the analysis we have assumed in all cases that quota rents were captured
by either exporting firms or exporting countries. In practice, some ways of allocating
licences for in-quota imports can have the effect of transfening the quota rent to the
importing country. This is the case, for example, where the licences are sold by the
importing country to the exporting firms; the proceeds of the sale, under the
assumption of perfect competition, benefits the importer and substitutes for the quota
rent accruing to the exporter. Even when licences are distributed freely, the method of
their allocation can benefit more powerful operators (as under the first come, first
served system) or make it more difficult for new entrants to gain or improve their
access to the import market (where licences are allocated on the basis of historic
shares). In other cases, import licences may be awarded to importing firms, thus
excluding the exporting country and firms resident there from sharing in the rent. In
other words, in those situations where the potential welfare gain to exporters as a
result of a TRQ is at its maximum, these same exporters risk losing some or all of
these gains to other agents depending on the market structure and the way in which
the TRQ is administered.
TRQs were introduced to improve or maintain access to the markets of developed
countries following the tariffication of non-tariff barriers. Access to developed
country agricultural markets is one of the major issues for developing countries in the
Doha Round of trade negotiations. Several countries have proposed an increase in
TRQ quotas in order to loosen the binding nature of TRQs and to increase access to
these quota-constrained markets. Taking into account the existence of competition
between suppliers with very different costs of production, the analysis developed in
this paper permits a more nuanced evaluation of this claim. Thus, in the case where a
TRQ is allocated solely to specific suppliers under the terms of a preferential trade
agreement (as in the case of Lomé-Cotonou), an increase in the size of a TRQ will
only have a positive effect on the export volumes of preferred suppliers if they are in a
position to fill the quota. Alternatively, if the increased TRQ is accompanied by an
opening up of the quota to other sources of non-preferred supply, this would be a form
of preference erosion and would result in a reduction in the economic welfare of
preferred suppliers if the increased import volume resulted in a sufficient reduction in
the import price. On the other hand, the new beneficiaries of the enlarged quota would
benefit from an increase in their export surplus or even from access to a quota rent if
they were sufficiently competitive and the TRQ remained binding. tn this case, the
matrner in which TRQ import licences are distributed between former preferred
suppliers and the new entrants would determine whether the trade advantages for
those developing countries for which the TRQ had previously been reserved would be
maintained.
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Parallel to this theoretical analysis, empirical work is being undertaken to evaluate the
extent to which developing countries benefit from a significant improvement in their
market access for agricultural products and in their economic welfare as a result of the
TRQ regime in comparison to a simple MFN tariff regime. The evaluation of the
quota rents and their division between exporters should be complemented by an
evaluation of the changes in exporter surplus in applying the analysis developed in
this paper to the 87 TRQs introduced by the EU at the time of the signing of the
URAA. The division of the gains between exporters depends on the characteristics of
each TRQ (whether it is binding or not, and the size of the in-quota tariff relative to
the over-quota tariff) and on the competing export supplies.
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